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We show how the formalization and application of schemata for program development
can be reduced to the formalization and application of derived rules of inference. We
formalize and derive schemata as rules in theories that axiomatize program data and
programs themselves. We reduce schema-based program development to ordinary the-
orem proving, where higher-order unification is used to apply rules. Conceptually, our
formalization is simple and unifies divergent views of schemata, program synthesis, and
program transformation. Practically, our formalization yields a simple methodology for
carrying out development using existing logical frameworks; we illustrate this in the do-
main of logic program synthesis and transformation using the Isabelle logical framework.
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1. Introduction
Research on program schemata originated in the 1960s as computer scientists investigated
programming concepts related to the control structure of programs, such as recursion
and iteration. They developed techniques that could be applied to obtain proofs of pro-
gram properties, in particular equivalence (Cooper, 1966; Manna and Vuillemin, 1972; de
Bakker and de Roever, 1973). For the sake of generality, proofs were constructed not only
for particular programs (like McCarthy’s well-known “91 function”) but also for classes
of programs that were instances of general schemata. It was quickly seen that program
schemata could be used not only for post hoc verification of program equivalence, but for
transformation as well, and as the basis for program transformation systems (Huet and
Lang, 1978).
Schemata play an important role in modern-day systems for program development,
including the synthesis of programs from non-executable specifications as well as the
transformation of one executable specification into another. As an example of this, and
to motivate the discussion ahead, consider Figure 1, which is a schema for transforming
a functional program to a tail recursive form. The schema is adapted from Hoffmann and
Krieg-Bru¨ckner (1993). It uses conditional equations to define F and G and states that
an equality between them holds, whenever two applicability premises also hold. These
premises state that R has a right identity N , and is associative. The variables F and
G do not name programs themselves, but rather program schemata, since their defining
bodies can be instantiated to different programs depending on how the schema variables
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Functional Definition for F
¬B(x)→ F (x) = T (x) (1.1)
B(x)→ F (x) = R(F (H(x)),K(x)) (1.2)
Functional Definition for G
¬B(x)→ G(x, y) = R(T (x), y) (1.3)
B(x)→ G(x, y) = G(H(x), R(K(x), y)) (1.4)
Applicability Premises:
R(x,N) = x (1.5)
R(R(x, y), z) = R(x,R(y, z)) (1.6)
Conclusion:
F (x) = G(x,N) (1.7)
Figure 1. Development schema for tail recursion introduction.
they contain are instantiated.† Hence this development schema expresses the equality
of infinitely many pairs of programs, each pair corresponding to an instantiation that
meets the applicability premises. When this schema is correct, we can use it for program
verification: given concrete functions f and g and a term n, we can verify that for every x,
f(x) = g(x, n), when f and g are instances of the program schemata and the applicability
premises hold. Alternatively, the schema can be used for program synthesis or program
transformation, depending on whether f itself is already executable. Given a particular
f , the schema can be applied to generate a corresponding g and n. In the case of this
particular schema, we can use it to transform a naive implementation of a list reversal
or factorial function to a more efficient tail recursive version.
1.1. contributions
This paper makes several contributions towards a clarified view of schema-based pro-
gram development. First, we propose that schemata can be understood, formalized, and
used in a simple way: program development schemata are derived rules. We mean this in
the standard sense of a derived rule of inference in logic. A schema like Figure 1 can be
formulated as a rule stating that the conclusion follows from the premises defining F , G,
and the applicability conditions. By deriving the rule in an axiomatic theory, we validate
a semantic statement about it: the conclusion of the rule holds in every model where
both the axioms of the theory and the premises of the rule are true. Hence, by selecting
a language to work in we control which development schemata are formalizable, and by
selecting a theory we determine which schemata are derivable.
This view of schemata is simple but powerful. It can be applied to formalize and
derive a large variety of schemata that are used in practice (see Section 5.3 for some
of the limitations) and we give examples that show applications associated with rather
different semantics.
Second, we clarify and advocate the role of logical frameworks in schema development
†We use capital letters to denote schema variables, lowercase letters near the end of the alphabet (e.g.
x, y, and z) to denote ordinary (term) variables, lowercase letters such as f , g, and h to denote concrete
(non-schematic) functions, and lowercase letters such as m, n, s, and t to denote terms.
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and application. If development schemata are derived rules, formal reasoning about them
requires the ability to reason about the rules of a theory, not merely the formulae of a
theory. We propose the use of logical frameworks based on formal metalogics for this task.
Specifically, a metalogic based on a minimal higher-order logic can provide a foundation
for formalizing the syntax and rules of object theories. All activities centered around
verifying and using schemata are reduced to theorem proving in a higher-order setting.
Logical frameworks (LFs) such as the implementations of the Edinburgh LF (Pfenning,
1991; Luo and Pollack, 1992) or Isabelle (Paulson, 1994b) are based on such metalogics
and are well suited for the kind of formalization we describe in this paper.
Third, we show how program verification, schema-based program development, and
even the development of schemata are closely related and can be viewed as points on
a continuum of theorem-proving activities. A schema is an inference rule, and can be
applied, like other rules, to program verification, for example to verify the equality be-
tween two functions f(x) = g(x, n). If we use higher-order unification to apply rules,
then schema application can be used for program synthesis or transformation; that is,
we can begin with one of the functions as an unknown named by a schema variable, and
synthesize an instance for it during proof. We show too that similarly we can synthesize
not only programs, but also development schemata themselves.
It is common folklore that there is a close connection between verification and synthesis;
for example, Prolog programmers know that if a predicate p(X) is provable and resolution
generates an instance t for X, then the same resolution steps (using instances of the
resolved clauses) verify p(t). Our work shows a number of ways to extend and apply
this kind of paradigm. Instead of using an axiomatized set of clauses as in Prolog, we
use general derived rules. Instead of using a fixed strategy for proof construction such
as SLD resolution, we use general interactive theorem proving. And instead of using
first-order syntax to build terms, we use higher-order syntax to build recursively defined
functions. Through examples, we illustrate that this generality is useful for different kinds
of schema-based reasoning, including the development of schemata themselves.
Finally, we show how our approach can unify schema-based program development
with other development methodologies. The use of schemata has sometimes been con-
sidered complementary to deductive approaches to program development based on the
application of inference rules. These approaches are sometimes called rules+strategies
(Pettorossi and Proietti, 1998) since development proceeds by applying inference rules
possibly guided by high-level strategies, which control the development process. By view-
ing schemata as rules and schema application as logical inference, the distinction between
schema-based development and development based on rules+strategies disappears.
This unification is not only conceptually interesting, but also practically useful. Our
formalization yields a simple methodology for carrying out schema-based development in
existing logical frameworks and experimenting with approaches that combine what are
traditionally seen as distinct development methodologies. The practical usefulness of this
is ultimately an empirical question. However, we give examples that suggest that it is
very easy to use an “off-the-shelf” logical framework to formalize, derive, and apply rule
schemata, to experiment with different semantics for schemata, and to carry out non-
trivial developments. We believe this is of interest both to specialists seeking to develop
and understand particular program development methodologies and to practitioners in-
terested in implementing and using such methodologies.
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1.2. organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formalize the
connection between development schemata and inference rules, and explain how derived
rules can be used for program development. In Section 3 we show how schemata may
be interpreted and derived in theories with different associated semantics. For the sake
of concreteness, we use logic program development as an example and present, in some
detail, a simple application in Section 4. A more extensive example is treated at a higher
level in Section 5, where we also consider the role schemata can play together with
other kinds of development methods. In Section 6 we discuss related work and we draw
conclusions in Section 7.
2. Development Schemata as Rules
Our focus in this section is on inference rules, their formalization in a logical metathe-
ory, and the mechanisms underlying their use in program derivation.
2.1. rules
We begin by specifying what we mean by an inference rule. Following Hindley and
Seldin (1986), we fix a logical language with a set of formulae F . For n a natural number,
every partial function φ from Fn to F determines a rule R(φ). We call each n-tuple
〈A1, . . . , An〉 in the domain of φ the premises, and if φ(A1, . . . , An) = B, then B is
the corresponding conclusion. As formalized, rules have finitely many premises, which is
enough for our purposes.





A and B are not formulae but rather variables that range over formulae. We call these
schema variables. A rule schema defines a rule: the partial function in which instances of
the premises are mapped to corresponding instances of the conclusion. Since schemata
are typically used to present rules, there is little harm in identifying the two concepts;
we will do that here too when no confusion can arise.
Given a language, a deductive system for it is given by a set of formulae called the
axioms, and a set of rules. A derivation of a formula B from a set of formulae A is a
formula-labeled tree: the leaves are labeled with either axioms or members of A, and the
root is labeled with B. A node labeled by A with children A1, . . . , An is an instance of a
rule with premises Ai and conclusion A. The set A is called the set of assumptions and
B is derivable from A; when there are no assumptions, B is said to be provable. The
deductive system determines a theory, namely the set of all provable sentences.
We call a rule derivable when, for each instance, there is a derivation of the conclusion
from the premises.† Derivability has a semantic side. Assume we have a class of models
for the language in question and a notion of what it means for a formula to be true in a
model from the class. A derived rule defines a consequence relation between the premises
†In contrast, a rule is admissible if the conclusion is provable whenever the premises are. Note, therefore,
that there are different possible notions of what it means to say that a rule is correct.
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and the conclusion: a rule is derivable if for any model where all the premises are true, so
is the conclusion. In Section 3 we show how different semantics for rules can be captured
by derivability in different theories.
2.2. formalizing rule schemata
Formalizing rule schemata means representing them in a formal language and reasoning
about them in a theory with a well-defined semantics. We now give a brief overview of
representation and derivability using languages and theories based on type theories.
We begin by considering syntax and the role of types. When schema variables range
over formulae, as in (2.1), instantiation is standard substitution for a first-order lan-
guage and instances may be found using first-order matching or unification. However, in
program development schemata, variables usually range over different kinds of syntactic
entities. For example, in the premise R(x,N) = x from Figure 1, the schema variable N
ranges over terms and R ranges over those functions that given two terms deliver a term.
“Ranges over” corresponds to a typing requirement, but such a function type for R is not
a type in the programming language, and cannot be treated by first-order substitution.
The simply typed λ-calculus provides a basis for formally representing and reasoning
about typed syntax like the above. This language constitutes a metalanguage in which
an object language is encoded. This idea goes back to Church’s use of the λ-calculus
to represent syntax in higher-order logic (Church, 1940). Since then, researchers have
explored other logics based on the λ-calculus, and in particular their use as metalogics,
which form the basis of metatheories (i.e. the metalogic is extended with metaformulae
as axioms) that represent the deductive systems of other object logics. These metalogics
typically extend the typed λ-calculus with (minimal) implication and universal quantifi-
cation over terms at all types. Examples include the metalogics of the Automath project
(de Bruijn, 1980), the Edinburgh LF (Harper et al., 1993), Isabelle (Paulson, 1994b), and
λ-Prolog (Felty and Miller, 1988). Deductive support for reasoning in these metalogics is
often based on higher-order unification (Huet, 1975; Pfenning, 1991), which can be used
to generate appropriate higher-order instances for schemata. We will assume some famil-
iarity with such logics and their use as metalogics; the reader lacking this background
should consult Harper et al. (1993).
Let V denote the set of (typed) variables of the λ-calculus. We divide the set of vari-
ables V into two kinds: term variables and schema variables. As a notational convention,
we write term variables as lowercase variables such as x, y, and z, and schema variables
as uppercase variables such as R and N . We call a well-typed term (possibly) containing
schema variables a schematic term. When no schema variables are present, we call it a
ground term. When working with schematic terms, we will usually consider only substi-
tutions where the domain consists of schematic variables, i.e. term variables are mapped
to themselves (effectively treated as constants). A program schema is a schematic term
whose instances correspond to programs in some language. A rule schema, as we have
seen, is given by an (n+ 1)-tuple of terms written
A1, . . . , An
B
(2.2)
where the Ai and B are schematic terms. Finally, we call a derivation a schematic deriva-
tion (or schematic proof, when there are no assumptions) when formulae labeling the
derivation are themselves schematic.
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The simply typed λ-calculus is an adequate representation language for program
schemata. A metalogic based on implication (=⇒) and universal quantification (∀), like
those previously mentioned, can be used as the basis of a metatheory that is adequate
to represent rule schemata.†
Consider a very simple example: representing an ordinary schematic inference rule
like modus ponens, given in (2.1). Let the language of the object logic (e.g. first-order
logic) be encoded in the typed λ-calculus. For instance, let o be a type whose elements
encode formulae of the object logic; we can then represent object logic implication using
the logical constant imp of type o ⇒ o ⇒ o. To represent inference rules we formulate
assertions about them as axioms. Let the unary predicate tr(A) represent the assertion
that the formula represented by A is true. Then modus ponens is encoded as
∀Ao Bo. tr(impAB) =⇒ tr(A) =⇒ tr(B), (2.3)
i.e. from the truth of A→ B and A, the truth of B follows. Note that implication in the
metalogic (which we associate to the right) and typed universal quantification should not
be confused with implication and quantification in the object logic.
To aid reading metaformulae, we can (as done in the Isabelle system) write iterated
implication A1 =⇒ · · · =⇒ An =⇒ A as [[A1; . . . ;An]] =⇒ A, use the infix notation →
instead of imp, and omit the predicate tr, which “lifts” object logic formulae to formulae
in the metatheory. Under these conventions, the above inference rule can be written as
∀Ao Bo. [[A→ B;A]] =⇒ B. (2.4)
Observe that the schema variables in a rule correspond to variables in the metalogic
that are universally quantified at the front of the formula. This is sensible: a schema
makes a statement about all its instances in the same way a universally quantified for-
mula does. This motivates the identification of schema variables in rules of the object
logic with variables in formulae of the metalogic that are outermost universally quan-
tified. As notational shorthand, consistent with this identification, we will often leave
these universal quantifiers implicit. Under all these conventions, the resulting formula is
similar syntactically to (it is a one-dimensional representation of) the rule schema that
it formalizes:
[[A→ B;A]] =⇒ B. (2.5)
In general, a rule schema like (2.2) determines a rule φ where φ(σ(A1), . . . , σ(An)) =
σ(B) for every (type correct, higher-order) substitution σ. This rule is derivable whenever
we can derive σ(B) from the assumptions σ(A1), . . . , σ(An). Given a formalization of
=⇒ as minimal implication in the metalogic, derivability of the rule in the object logic
is equivalent to the provability of the metaformula
[[σ(A1); . . . ;σ(An)]] =⇒ σ(B)
in the metatheory. This in turn follows (e.g. by ∀-elimination in the metalogic) from the
provability of (the universal closure) of
[[A1; . . . ;An]] =⇒ B.
†Adequacy is a technical notion (Harper et al., 1993). Very roughly, adequacy for a language means that
every well-typed term represents a term of the appropriate syntactic category and vice versa. Adequacy
for rule schemata corresponds to capturing derivability in the metatheory.
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Hence, rule schemata for an object logic can be identified with formulae of the metathe-
ory. A schema like that of Figure 1 corresponds to a metaformula stating that the premises
imply the conclusion, i.e.
[[(1.1); (1.2); (1.3); (1.4); (1.5); (1.6)]] =⇒ (1.7).
The formalization of the object logic in the metatheory determines a class of models,
and the derivability of this formula expresses the semantic property that in any model
in which (1.1)–(1.6) are true, (1.7) is true.
2.3. construction of derivations and deductive synthesis
As stated above, a derivation is a formula-labeled tree whose leaves are either axioms
or assumptions. When considering the process of interactively building derivations, we
take the view implemented in the Isabelle system (Paulson, 1994b): it is useful to allow
the assumption set to vary while constructing a derivation. At the start of the derivation,
the initial goal is also the initial assumption, and at any point in the derivation the goal
is derivable under the assumptions labeling the leaves. Under this view, the derivation is
a proof precisely when all leaves are labeled by axioms.
A derivation is constructed by applying a rule to a leaf. When a rule is represented by
a metaformula
[[A1; . . . ;An]] =⇒ B,
it can be applied to a formula F labeling a leaf whenever there is a higher-order sub-
stitution σ such that σ(B) = F , where = is equality in the λ-calculus. In this case, the
derivation is extended so that F has the children σ(A1), . . . , σ(An). Observe though that
if we allow schematic derivations, then F itself may contain metavariables and higher-
order unification can be used to find a σ where σ(B) = σ(F ). The substitution must
furthermore be applied to all the formulae labeling the derivation tree, since they may
share schematic variables with F . Applying inference rules this way is called higher-order
resolution (Paulson, 1985, 1989). In general σ is not unique; each rule may have a set of
applications at a leaf, each computing a different substitution and resulting in a different
derivation.
The application of substitutions to schematic derivations can be used as the mecha-
nism for deductive program development (e.g. program synthesis or transformation). The
process of constructing a derivation iteratively applies substitutions, and this in turn in-
crementally instantiates schema variables with terms that represent refined specifications
or, when executable, programs.
More precisely, we can impose a total order on a derivation that respects the partial
order induced by the tree structure. Let an ordered derivation be a derivation tree of m
nodes that is further labeled by the natural numbers 1 . . .m, where the root is labeled
1, and on any path from the root to a leaf, all the labels are strictly increasing. Let the
substitution computed by an application of the rule applied to node i be σi. With every
ordered derivation D we may associate a substitution σD, defined as the composition
σm ◦ σm−1 ◦ · · · ◦ σ1.
Now if G is the initial goal formula of an ordered derivation D, the root of D is labeled
with σD(G). As a result, if G contains schema variables in the domain of σD, the formula
derived is not G but the substitution instance of it determined by σD. Moreover, any
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leaf formula introduced as a premise Ai of an inference rule containing schema variables
is also the substitution instance σD(Ai). If {A1, . . . , An} is the set of assumptions in the
derivation, then the derivation demonstrates the derivability of the rule represented by
[[σD(A1), . . . , σD(An)]] =⇒ σD(G).
As we will see in Section 3, some of the assumptions σD(Ai) may define programs or
program schemata (like F and G in Figure 1) and σD(G) may be a statement about
these programs or schemata. Thus deductive program development may be used to derive
programs or new program development schemata. In Section 3.2 we give an example
showing how deduction can be used in the derivation and specialization of schematic
rules.
2.4. realization in a logical framework
Our account of schemata as rules and development as deduction by higher-order reso-
lution has practical applications. There are logical frameworks (proof assistants based on
formal metalogics) that support the formalization, derivation, and application of rules
as described above. We have used the Isabelle logical framework for our case-studies
in schematic development. There are other possibilities, e.g. the ELF logical framework
(Pfenning, 1991); however Isabelle fits well with our requirements. It provides a formal
metalogic with a sophisticated type system, proof construction by higher-order resolu-
tion, support for hierarchical construction of theories, and support for automation. The
overview of Isabelle given here is limited; Paulson (1994b) provides a full account.
Isabelle’s metalogic is a minimal higher-order logic, based on implication (=⇒) and
universal quantification (∀), supporting polymorphic typing augmented with type classes.
Polymorphic typing introduces another kind of schematic variable, namely schematic
variables that range over types. This has important applications in our work: in Section 3
we derive rules containing schematic type variables and later specialize these rules both
with respect to term and type instances.
Object logics are encoded in Isabelle’s metalogic by declaring types and term construc-
tors to represent the language syntax, followed by metaformulae that represent inference
rules. Free variables in formulae are implicitly universally quantified; hence a formula
like (2.4) is written as (2.5). The Isabelle distribution comes with a number of encoded
object logics and theories. For our case studies we used an implementation of higher-
order logic (Isabelle/HOL) extended with theories of typed sets, inductive definitions,
well-founded orders, and simple program data types.
Derivations in Isabelle are constructed by applying rules, encoded as metaformulae, us-
ing higher-order resolution. For the purposes of top-down proof construction, a metafor-
mula [[A1; . . . ;An]] =⇒ B can be viewed as a proof state, where B is the goal to be
established and the Ai represent the subgoals to be proven. Under this view an initial
proof state has the form G =⇒ G, i.e. it has one subgoal, namely G. The final proof
state is itself the desired theorem G. Rules are applied interactively, but their application
can be automated using programs, called tactics, that construct proofs. Isabelle comes
with a well-developed collection of tactics for common theorem proving tasks, such as
rewriting. This was important for our development: we could use standard theories and
tactics provided by Isabelle to carry out case studies quickly.
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3. Deriving Development Schemata
We now turn to examples to illustrate our thesis that development schemata are derived
rules of inference and that schematic proof techniques can be used to develop schemata
themselves. Our examples are three schemata for logic program development, and they
demonstrate the flexibility of our approach in developing related schemata for different
programming language semantics. Our derivations provide evidence that it is possible to
use a generic logical framework for schematic development, building on standard theories
with little additional effort.
Schemata for functional programs have been thoroughly studied, and there is a large
body of published program transformations (Huet and Lang, 1978; Partsch, 1990; Hoff-
mann and Krieg-Bru¨ckner, 1993). In previous work (Basin et al., 1993), we have explored
the formalization of such transformations in a framework similar to that proposed here.
These ideas extend to logic programs, as demonstrated in Basin (1994), Anderson and
Basin (1995). Further experiments have shown that functional and logic program nota-
tions can be combined, allowing the development of programs in mixed notations like
Go¨del (Hill and Lloyd, 1991), and allowing the development of logic programs from par-
tially functional specifications. Our examples will be drawn from these experiments, and
in this section we consider development schemata for logic programs that are straight-
forward translations of functional ones.
We can translate the functional development schema of Figure 1 to a relational form
suitable for logic programs by flattening it, which entails replacing n-ary functions with
(n + 1)-ary relations and replacing nested functions with conjoined relations that share
existentially quantified variables. For example, the conditional equation (1.2) of Figure 1
B(x)→ F (x) = R(F (H(x)),K(x))
is flattened by forming the following conditional equivalence
B(x)→ (F (x, y)↔ ∃x1x2x3.H(x, x1) ∧K(x, x2) ∧ F (x1, x3) ∧R(x3, x2, y))
i.e. (3.2) of Figure 2. Flattening all the equations of Figure 1 in a similar way yields the
translated schema in Figure 2.†
When translated into Isabelle/HOL, this schema is a sentence of the metalogic but it is
not derivable (there are counter-models). The following sections show how variants of it
can be formally derived. In the functional setting we can reason about the equivalence of
programs by reasoning about their meaning relative to a given semantics. For example, if
recursive functions are interpreted as fixedpoints of functionals, then we can reason about
a function by reasoning about the limit of its approximating functions. The equivalence
of F and G in Figure 1 is provable by such reasoning. This approach is not available for
reasoning about relational schemata.
In the remainder of the section, we present three variants of this schema that are
derivable. The first two, presented in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, are based on induction prin-
ciples for the data of the programs. The third, in Section 3.3, formalizes the programs
as inductively defined relations instead, i.e. it formalizes a particular semantics of logic
programs.
†All the examples in this paper have been implemented in Isabelle/HOL. However, we will often use
conventional logical notation, e.g. when writing schemata, and reserve more computer-oriented syntax
for when we want to emphasize the “look and feel” of formal, computer-supported, development.
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Relational Definition for F
¬B(x)→ (F (x, y)↔ T (x, y)) (3.1)
B(x)→ (F (x, y)↔ ∃x1 x2 x3. H(x, x1) ∧K(x, x2) ∧ F (x1, x3) ∧R(x3, x2, y))
(3.2)
Relational Definition for G
¬B(x)→ (G(x, y, z)↔ ∃x1. T (x, x1) ∧R(x1, y, z)) (3.3)
B(x)→ (G(x, y, z)
↔ ∃x1 x2 x3. H(x, x1) ∧K(x, x2) ∧R(x2, y, x3) ∧G(x1, x3, z)) (3.4)
Applicability Conditions:
R(x,N, y)↔ (x = y) (3.5)
(∃y1. R(x, y, y1) ∧R(y1, z, r))↔ (∃z1. R(y, z, z1) ∧R(x, z1, r)) (3.6)
Conclusion:
F (x, y)↔ G(x,N, y)
Figure 2. Schema for tail recursion introduction, relational form.
3.1. induction on well-founded data-types
When a logic program (or program schema) is represented as a set of relations defined
by recursive equivalences, as in Figure 2, inductive reasoning principles for it can be
obtained when the terms it manipulates have an associated well-founded ordering and
recursive calls to predicates manipulate terms that are smaller in the ordering. Here
we explore schema derivation where we hypothesize the existence of such an ordering
(the user must instantiate and prove this premise later with a particular ordering when
applying the schema) and verify the schema by induction over the ordering.
The ordering is defined by a well-founded relation, which we call a descent relation
by analogy to descent functions in functional programming. A descent relation must
be used in such a way that recursive calls are smaller under this relation. Rather than
defining conditions sufficient in general for this, we consider a special case sufficient for
the examples at hand. If a predicate p has a defining recursive equivalence of the form
p(x1, . . . , xn)↔ ∃y1 . . . ym.d(x1, yi) ∧ p(yi, t1, . . . , tn−1) ∧ q(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym)
where 1 ≤ i ≤ m and the t1, . . . , tn−1 are terms possibly containing the x1, . . . , xn and
y1, . . . , ym free, then we say that d is a descent relation for p. This can be extended in
the obvious way to schemata where p, d, and q are schema variables. A principle for
reasoning about p by induction on its first argument can be obtained, without restricting
instantiations of p to terms of a particular type, by explicitly stating an applicability
premise that ensures the well foundedness of the descent relation d.
For example, in the schema of Figure 2, F and G share the descent relation H. If we
add a premise to the schema stating that H is well founded, we obtain the schema of
Figure 3, which is provable by induction on x.
This schema can be encoded as a metaformula to be proved in Isabelle/HOL. We
exhibit the user input (with slight cosmetic adjustments and the addition of reference
numbers). The numbered formulae are the premises of the meta-implication, while the
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Relational Definition for F
¬B(x)→ (F (x, y)↔ T (x, y)) (3.7)
B(x)→ (F (x, y)↔ ∃x1 x2 x3. H(x, x1) ∧K(x, x2) ∧ F (x1, x3) ∧R(x3, x2, y))
(3.8)
Relational Definition for G
¬B(x)→ (G(x, y, z)↔ ∃x1. T (x, x1) ∧R(x1, y, z)) (3.9)
B(x)→ (G(x, y, z)
↔ ∃x1 x2 x3. H(x, x1) ∧K(x, x2) ∧R(x2, y, x3) ∧G(x1, x3, z)) (3.10)
Applicability Conditions:
wf(H) (3.11)
R(x,N, y)↔ (x = y) (3.12)
(∃y1. R(x, y, y1) ∧R(y1, z, r))↔ (∃z1. R(y, z, z1) ∧R(x, z1, r)) (3.13)
Conclusion:
F (x, y)↔ G(x,N, y)
Figure 3. Tail recursion schema based on well-founded relations.
final line is the conclusion. Although the conclusion appears in subsequent proof state
displays, Isabelle hides the premises to reduce the amount of information presented to
the user.
Proof of Goal 3.1
[[ ∀ x y. ¬ B x→ F x y = T x y; [1]
∀x y. B x→ F x y = (∃x1 x2 x3. H x x1 & K x x2 & F x1 x3 & R x3 x2 y); [2]
∀x y z. ¬ B x→ G x y z = (∃x1. T x x1 & R x1 y z); [3]
∀x y z. B x→
G x y z = (∃x1 x2 x3. H x x1 & K x x2 & R x2 y x3 & G x1 x3 z); [4]
wf{(x, y) | x y. H y x}; [5]
∀x y. R x N y = (x = y); [6]
∀x y z r. (∃y1. R x y y1 & R y1 z r) = (∃z1. R y z z1 & R x z1 r) [7]
]] =⇒ ∀x y. F x y = G x N y
In Isabelle/HOL syntax, function application is denoted by juxtaposition and func-
tions are curried, so that F (x, y) is encoded as F x y. The equality sign = denotes a
polymorphically typed equality between propositions as well as terms, so that in, e.g.
premise (6) the first = is logical equivalence, while the second = is equality between
terms. The logical connectives and quantifiers →, & , ∀, and ∃ are object-level syntax,
while the brackets [[ ]], the quantifier ∀, and the connectives “;” and =⇒ are metalevel
syntax (described in Section 2.4). Parentheses are not only used for grouping, but also for
tupling, so in premise (5), (x, y) is a pair. Set comprehension notation is nearly standard,
but—as seen in premise (5)—the bound variables are explicitly listed to the right of the
vertical bar. Free variables in the goal are implicitly outermost universally quantified at
the metalevel.
Isabelle/HOL comes with a theory of well-founded orderings. This supports the direct
formalization of the added premise (3.11) and provides associated induction principles.
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(The formalization of (3.11) as premise (5) swaps the order of arguments to the descent
relation H because Isabelle/HOL defines well-foundedness to apply to a set of pairs where
the first element of the pair is “smaller” in the well founded ordering.)
The machine-assisted proof of Goal 3.1 formalizes a well-known inductive argument.
We outline it by giving some of the intermediate proof states, in order to show how
schema verification reduces to proof in this setting.
The first step of the proof introduces a generalization to be proved by induction,
yielding two subgoals:
Proof of State 3.2
∀x y. F x y = G x N y
(1) ∀x y.
∀y z. (∃v. F x v & R v y z) = G x y z
=⇒ F x y = G x N y
(2) ∀x y.
∀y z. (∃v. F x v & R v y z) = G x y z
To solve Subgoal (1), we show that the generalization (Subgoal (2)) implies the con-
clusion by instantiating y in the hypothesis with N and simplifying using premise 6
of Goal 3.1. We attack the remaining subgoal with well-founded induction over the first
argument of F . In two-dimensional notation, an induction rule for a well-founded set r is:
wf(r)
[∀y. (y, x) ∈ r → φ(y)]···
φ(x)
φ(a)
Applying the Isabelle encoding of this rule leads to the following proof state (set mem-
bership is denoted by infix “:”).
Proof of State 3.3
∀x y. F x y = G x N y
(1) ∀x x1.
∀y. (y, x1) : {(x, y)|x y. H y x} → (∀y1 z. (∃v. F y v & R v y1 z) = G y y1 z)
=⇒ ∀y z. (∃v. F x1 v & R v y z) = G x1 y z
We next do a case split on B(x). When ¬B(x) holds, Isabelle/HOL’s simplifier solves
the goal using the definitions of F and G (premises (1)–(4) of Goal 3.1). At the same
time, the simplifier expands these definitions in the remaining subgoal:
Proof of State 3.4
∀x y. F x y = G x N y
(1) ∀x y z.
[[∀y. (y, x) : {(x, y)|x y. H y x} → (∀y1 z. (∃v. F y v & R v y1 z) = G y y1 z);
B x]]
=⇒ (∃v. (∃x1. H x x1 & (∃x2. K x x2 & (∃x3. F x1 x3 & R x3 x2 v)))
& R v y z)
= (∃x1. H x x1 & (∃x2. K x x2 & (∃x3. R x2 y x3 & G x1 x3 z)))
After some rearranging of terms, this gives us the syntactic form needed to apply the
associativity of R (premise (7) of Goal 3.1), yielding:
Schemata as Derived Rules 17
[[ ∀ x y. ¬ ?B x→ ?F x y = ?T x y;
∀x y. ?B x→ ?F x y = (∃x1 x2 x3. ?H x x1 & ?K x x2 & ?F x1 x3 & ?R x3 x2 y);
∀x y z. ¬ ?B x→ ?G x y z = (∃x1. ?T x x1 & ?R x1 y z);
∀x y z. ?B x→ ?G x y z = (∃x1 x2 x3. ?H x x1 & ?K x x2 & ?R x2 y x3 & ?G x1 x3 z);
wf{(x, y) | x y. ?H y x};
∀x y. ?R x ?N y = (x = y);
∀x y z r. (∃y1. ?R x y y1 & ?R y1 z r) = (∃z1. ?R y z z1 & ?R x z1 r)
]] =⇒ ∀x y. ?F x y = ?G x ?N y
Figure 4. Isabelle/HOL encoding of Figure 3.
Proof of State 3.5
∀x y. F x y = G x N y
(1) ∀x y z.
[[∀y. (y, x) : {(x, y)|x y. H y x} → (∀y1 z. (∃v. F y v & R v y1 z) = G y y1 z);
Bx]]
=⇒ (∃x1. H x x1 & (∃x2. K x x2 & (∃x3. (∃z1. R x2 y z1 & R x3 z1 z) & F x1 x3)))
= (∃x1. H x x1 & (∃x2. K x x2 & (∃x3. R x2 y x3 & G x1 x3 z)))
The conclusion now follows trivially from the induction hypothesis; the proof assistant
solves the goal by simplification, followed by an automatic procedure based on depth-first
search. Altogether the proof required five commands to the proof assistant.
Upon completion of the proof, Isabelle converts the rule to a standard form, replacing
the free variables (F , G, and the other uppercase letters) by schema variables (prefixed
by “?”), as shown in Figure 4. Since schema variables are subject to instantiation through
higher-order unification when the rule is subsequently applied in program development,
Figure 4 encodes the schema of Figure 3.
3.2. specialization to an inductive data type
The rule of Figure 4 can be used to transform a large class of programs that compute
over data types such as numbers, lists or strings. This wide applicability is a result of the
generality of the schema: not only have we avoided committing to particular functions
by using schema variables, the types of the schematic functions are polymorphic (they
have schematic types). For example, the type of F is α⇒ β ⇒ bool and the type of G is
α⇒ α⇒ β ⇒ bool, for any types α and β.
In practice, we may want to repeatedly apply the schema to improve programs oper-
ating over a particular data type, such as lists. In this case, repeated application would
require repeatedly proving the well foundedness of the same descent relation. Although
the well foundedness property can be captured as a lemma, this solution is not ideal.
Moreover, the program syntax of Figure 4 is awkward, compared with the pattern match-
ing usual in recursive logic programs. Specializing the schema to a particular data type
can solve these problems.
As an example we show how to specialize the rule of Figure 4 to polymorphic lists,
built from the constructors [] (the empty list) and # (the infix function constant “cons”).
A simple way to do this is to synthesize the specialized rule schema from the more general
one. The derivation is schematic in the sense of Section 2.2. Since the output program
schema and the applicability premises are synthesized in the course of the derivation, the
initial goal specifies only the types of the schematic variables, the input program schema
and the equivalence between the input and output programs.
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We give the goal here, but omit the type annotations. Note that F , T , etc. in the goal
are free variables, implicitly universally quantified at the metalevel.
Proof of Goal 3.6
[[∀y. F [] y = T y;
∀h t y. F (h#t) y) = (∃x1 x2. K h t x1 & F t x2 & R x2 x1 y)
]] =⇒ ∀x y. F x y = G x N y
The two premises represent the input program schema, which has the usual form for
logic programs defined by recursion over lists, instead of the conditional form of Figure 4.
The occurrences of the constructors “[]” and “#” guide the synthesis of the specialized
rule.
The first step in the synthesis is to apply the schema of Figure 4, at the same time
specifying instantiations for the guard B and the descent relation H:
B ←7 λx. x 6= [], H ←7 λxy. y = tl x ∧ x 6= []
In addition to these explicit instantiations, the unification of the goal with the conclusion
of Figure 4 produces the obvious substitution:
?F←7 F, ?N←7 N, ?G←7 G
This introduces subgoals that are partial instantiations of the premises of Figure 4:
Proof of State 3.7
∀x y. F x y = G x N y
(1) ∀x y. ¬x 6= []→ F x y = ?T x y
(2) ∀x y. x 6= []→
F x y = (∃x1 x2 x3. (x1 = tl x & x 6= []) & ?K x x2 & F x1 x3 & ?R x3 x2 y)
(3) ∀x y z. ¬x 6= []→ G x y z = (∃x1. ?T x x1 & ?R x1 y z)
(4) ∀x y z. x 6= []→
G x y z = (∃x1 x2 x3. (x1 = tl x & x 6= []) & ?K x x2 & ?R x2 y x3 & G x1 x3 z)
(5) wf{(x, y)|x y. x = tl y & y 6= []}
(6) ∀x y. ?R x N y = (x = y)
(7) ∀x y z r. (∃y1. ?R x y y1 & ?R y1 z r) = (∃z1. ?R y z z1 & ?R x z1 r)
In subsequent steps, Subgoals (1), (2) and (5) are proved, producing further substitu-
tions for the schema variables, while the others are left unproved but are further instan-
tiated and simplified, producing the output program schema and applicability premises
for the new development schema.
Because of the substitutions forB andH, Subgoals (1) and (2) are partial instantiations
of the defining equivalences for F of Figure 4. These two subgoals follow easily from the
definition of F given in the goal. During the proof, the substitution is extended to
?K←7 λu v. K (hd u) (tl u) v, ?T←7 T, ?R←7 R,
yielding:
Proof of State 3.8
∀x y. F x y = G x N y
(1) ∀x y z. ¬x 6= []→ G x y z = (∃x1. T x1 & R x1 y z)
(2) ∀x y z. x 6= []→
G x y z = (∃x1 x2 x3. (x1 = tl x & x 6= []) & K (hd x) (tl x) x2 & R x2 y x3 & G x1 x3 z)
(3) wf{(x, y)|x y. x = tl y & y 6= []}
(4) ∀x y. R x N y = (x = y)
(5) ∀x y z r. (∃y1. R x y y1 & R y1 z r) = (∃z1. R y z z1 & R x z1r)
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[[∀y. ?F [] y = ?T y;
∀h t y. ?F (h#t) y = (∃x1 x2. ?K h t x1 & ?F t x2 & ?R x2 x1 y);
∀y z. ?G [] y z = (∃x1. ?T x1 & ?R x1 y z);
∀x xa y z. ?G (x#xa) y z = (∃x1. ?K x xa x1 & (∃x2. ?R x1 y x2 & ?G xa x2 z));
∀x y. ?R x ?N y = (x = y);
∀x y z r. (∃y1. ?R x y y1 & ?R y1 z r) = (∃z1. ?R y z z1 & ?R x z1 r)
]] =⇒ ∀x y. ?F x y = ?G x ?N y
Figure 5. Isabelle encoding of tail recursion introduction schema specialized to lists.
The rest of the derivation consists primarily of proving that the descent relation
λx y. y = tl x ∧ x 6= [], given in Subgoal (3), is well founded. This is provable by
structural induction over lists, a principle provided as part of Isabelle’s data type facil-
ity (Paulson, 1994a).
The result is:
Proof of State 3.9
∀x y. F x y = G x N y
(1) ∀x y z. ¬x 6= []→ G x y z = (∃x1. T x1 & R x1 y z)
(2) ∀x. x 6= []→
∀y z. G x y z = (∃x2. K (hd x) (tl x) x2 & (∃x3. R x2 y x3 & G (tl x) x3 z))
(3) ∀x y. R x N y = (x = y)
(4) ∀x y z r. (∃y1. R x y y1 & R y1 z r) = (∃z1. R y z z1 & R x z1 r)
The remaining subgoals are not proved, but rather discharged at the metalevel to
become premises of the new derived rule. However, first it is desirable to simplify the
defining equations for G to remove the conditionals guarding them. After the simplifica-
tion we discharge the remaining four assumptions to obtain the rule of Figure 5.
This example is a first look at the deductive synthesis process outlined in Section 2.3.
It uses a development schema, not to transform a concrete program, but to synthesize
a new, more specialized, development schema. Beginning with a schematic definition of
F , the deductive process synthesizes a schematic definition of G, as well as the applica-
bility premises, by resolution with the more general schematic rule of Figure 3, followed
by further theorem proving. Because we use a general-purpose logical framework rather
than a special-purpose program development system, there is little conceptual or prac-
tical difference between the development of a new schema and the development of a
program.
3.3. relational induction
The validity of the previous two schemata follows from properties of the data ma-
nipulated by logic programs represented as recursive equivalences. An alternative is to
formalize a more restrictive semantics for logic programs. We explore this alternative
here and formalize a semantics where logic programs inductively define sets.
This approach can be seen as specializing our theory to reflect one of the standard
semantics of logic programs—that given by the least Herbrand model (van Emden and
Kowalski, 1976). This model corresponds to viewing a program as constituting an induc-
tive definition of a set of predicates: a Herbrand model is a fixedpoint of this inductive
definition. First-order logic cannot characterize this model, but it can be directly ex-
pressed in higher-order logic by an inductive definition. The view of logic programs as
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inductive definitions has been explored (primarily in the context of negation-as-failure)
by a number of authors including Hagiya and Sakurai (1984), Aronsson et al. (1991), and
Paulson and Smith (1991). Here we adopt this view and use it to establish the correctness
of another way of formalizing development schemata.
inductive definitions
First we briefly review the kind of inductive definitions we use; the general theory can
be found, for example, in Aczel (1977). An inductive definition is given by a set of definite
clauses that define a relation, i.e. a set. A trivial example is the program
Num(0)
Num(s(x))← Num(x)
which defines a set Num containing all natural numbers built from 0 and the successor
function s. The first clause constitutes the base case, and the second explains how, given
a term in the set, we can add a new term to the set. Iterating the second clause (perhaps
transfinitely) we will reach a fixedpoint that corresponds to the minimal Herbrand model.
Any inductively defined set justifies an induction principle corresponding to its defining





We may view schemata like Figure 2 as specifying an inductive definition corresponding
to each program schema. We can orient each equivalence in a schematic definition from
right-to-left, bringing the condition into the body of the clause. For example, the first
two equivalences correspond to the clauses†
F (x, y)← ¬B(x) ∧ T (x, y) (3.14)
and
F (x, y)← B(x) ∧H(x, x1) ∧K(x, x2) ∧R(x3, x2, y) ∧ F (x1, x3). (3.15)
Now, we can take F to be the set that is inductively defined by these clauses. The
corresponding induction principle is:
F (x, y)
[¬B(x), T (x, y)]···
φ(x, y)
[B(x), H(x, x1),K(x, x2), R(x3, x2, y), φ(x1, x3)]···
φ(x, y)
φ(x, y)
†These are not, strictly speaking, definite clauses since some atoms such as B occur negatively. However,
they constitute parameterized inductive definitions where the set being defined, e.g. F , occurs only
positively in the defining body.
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Similarly, the induction principle corresponding to G(x, y, z) is:
G(x, y, z)
[¬B(x), T (x, x1), R(x1, y, z)]···
φ(x, y, z)
[B(x), H(x, x1),K(x, x2), R(x2, y, x3), φ(x1, x3, z)]···
φ(x, y, z)
φ(x, y, z)
As we shall see next, these two induction rules suffice to justify the schema of Figure 2.
representation and proof in Isabelle
Formalizing the meaning of a logic program as an inductive definition requires a logic
or theory capable of formalizing and reasoning about inductive definitions. Both higher-
order logic and set theory are candidates for this because inductive definitions can be
expressed in both of them based on an internally formalized account of the Knaster–
Tarski fixedpoint theorem (see Paulson, 1994a). Theorem provers such as Isabelle/HOL
and the HOL system come with packages that support the formalization of inductive
definitions. The user inputs a sets of clauses and from these the system constructs an
inductive definition (as the least fixedpoint of an appropriate function) and supplies and
proves the associated induction principles, which can be used in subsequent proofs about
the defined sets.
In Isabelle/HOL, the inductive definitions of F and G are given by clauses (encoded
as metaformulae) that formalize the two inductively defined sets. However, inductive
definitions in Isabelle define constants, and we want to prove the rule for any F and
G. Thus the problem is to represent a development schema using inductively defined
constants. The solution is to define each inductive set in terms of parameters and to
supply metavariables for these parameters when formulating the schema.
In our tail recursion example, the first step is to provide parameterized inductive
definitions of F and G; Figure 6 presents the Isabelle source.† These definitions directly
formalize the clausal definitions of F and G as metaformulae. For example, the clause
fBase corresponds to (3.14); F (x, y) is rendered as (x, y) : f B T H K R N because f
is a parameterized inductively defined set, not a predicate (and recall that Isabelle/HOL
functions are curried). As before, “:” represents set membership and “(, )” is pairing.
(Although sets and predicates are equal in HOL, they are not identical in the metalogic.)
From this definition, Isabelle automatically constructs and derives a number of in-
ference rules, including induction principles for f and g corresponding to those given
previously. These allow us to prove Goal 3.10, which encodes the applicability conditions
and the conclusion of Figure 2. Together with the inductive definitions of f and g, this
is a complete representation in Isabelle of the development schema.
Proof of Goal 3.10
[[∀ x y. (R x N y) = (x = y)
∀ x y z r. (∃y1. (R y1 z r) & (R x y y1)) = (∃z1. (R x z1 r) & (R y z z1));
]] =⇒ ∀ x y. (x, y) : f B T H K R N = (x,N, y) : g B T H K R N ;
Note that, in this goal, f and g are constants, while the capitalized variables are free
variables, which become schema variables in the derived rule.
†We have omitted type declarations and annotations for the sake of readability.
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inductive “f B T H K R N”
intrs
fBase “[[¬(B x); T x y]] =⇒ (x, y) : f B T H K R N”
fStep “[[B x; H x x1; K x x2; R x3 x2 y; (x1, x3) : f B T H K R N
]] =⇒ (x, y) : f B T H K R N”
inductive “g B T H K R N”
intrs
gBase “[[¬(B x); T x x1; R x1 y z]] =⇒ (x, y, z) : g B T H K R N”
gStep “[[B x; H x x1; K x x2; R x2 y x3;
(x1, x3, z) : g B T H K R N ]] =⇒ (x, y, z) : g B T H K R N”
Figure 6. Inductive definitions of program schemata.
We have used the induction principles to justify this rule in a theory that extends
HOL with the inductive definitions of f and g given above. The machine-assisted proof
was somewhat harder than the one for the corresponding rule based on well-founded
sets; here we just give the main ideas. We use the same generalization as in the proof by
well-founded induction. Then we split the equivalence into separate proofs for each direc-
tion. To show that the right-hand side implies the left-hand side, we use the assumption
g(x, y, z); using the induction rule for g we prove the induction formula ∃v. f(x, v) ∧
R(v, y, z). This follows by the expansion of definitions and simplification with the appli-
cability conditions. In the converse direction we have f(x, v), and using the induction
rule for f we prove the induction formula ∀y z. R(v, y, z)→ g(x, y, z).
discussion
The representation of logic programs as inductively defined sets has the virtues of
semantic accuracy and wide applicability. It avoids confusion between logic programs,
represented as inductively defined sets, and purely logical applicability conditions, repre-
sented as logical formulae. Because the encoding faithfully reflects the semantics of logic
programs, inductive reasoning is possible for any encoded program and it is not necessary
to find induction principles based on the program’s data.
These advantages come at some cost in readability, intuitiveness, and ease of proof.
Instead of the predicate notation familiar to logic programmers, set membership notation
is mixed with predicate notation in program encodings. Theorem proving is complicated
by the need to explicitly convert sets to predicates.
Although this representation of logic programs is quite different from the use of re-
cursive equivalences, the encoding and proof of development schemata differs only in
the details. The schema development methodology is independent of the choice of the
underlying theory.
4. Application of Transformation Schemata
Isabelle’s proof facilities can be used in a uniform way both to derive schemata and
to apply them in program derivation. The derivation in Section 3.2 demonstrates the
application of one schema in the derivation of another. This section further illustrates
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schema application by showing its use in program development: we describe how to apply
the specialized rule for tail recursion developed in Section 3.2 to the familiar list reverse
problem. For the sake of concreteness we include snapshots of the Isabelle proof states.
A naive Prolog program to reverse a list is:
reverse([],[]).
reverse([H|T],Y) :- reverse(T,I1), append(I1,[H],Y).
Its running time is quadratic in the size of the input because it uses append to construct
the result Y . Transforming such programs to obtain linear time complexity is a standard
exercise. We show how to do this using the schema of Figure 5.
The derivation begins with the statement of the goal.†
Proof of Goal 4.1
[[∀y. reverse([], y) = (y = []);
∀h t y. reverse(h#t, y) = (∃x1 x2. x1 = [h] & reverse(t, x2) & append(x2, x1, y))
]] =⇒ reverse(x, y) = ?Q x y
The Prolog program reverse is represented by the premises and the goal is to show
its equivalence to the (not yet given) program named by ?Q. We define programs to
operate on tuples in order to obtain a syntax closer to ordinary logic programs. Thus,
although schematic functions are written in curried notation, the notation for concrete
programs is uncurried. Note that using reverse([], []) in place of the first premise would
not be accurate in this representation of programs; by using an equivalence we represent
“negative information” (see Section 6.2 for more on this point) and rule out the possibility
that the second argument is non-empty, e.g. reverse([], [1, 2, 3]).
As the derivation proceeds, a definition for ?Q is synthesized. The first step is to resolve
with the development schema of Figure 5, at the same time specifying the instantiation
λx y z. qrev(x, y, z) for ?G. Isabelle responds with six subgoals corresponding to the
premises of the schema.
Proof of State 4.2
∀x y. reverse(x, y) = qrev(x, ?N1, y)
(1) ∀y. reverse([], y) = ?T1 y
(2) ∀h t y. reverse(h#t, y) = (∃x1 x2. ?K1 h t x1 & reverse(t, x2) & ?R1 x2 x1 y)
(3) ∀y z. qrev([], y, z) = (∃x1. ?T1 x1 & ?R1 x1 y z)
(4) ∀h t y z. qrev(h#t, y, z) = (∃x1 x2. ?K1 h t x1 & ?R1 x1 y x2 & qrev(t, x2, z))
(5) ∀x y. ?R1 x ?N1 y = (x = y)
(6) ∀x y z r. (∃y1. ?R1 x y y1 & ?R1 y1 z r) = (∃z1. ?R1 y z z1 & ?R1 x z1 r)
Resolution has instantiated ?F in the schema to λx y. reverse(x, y). The derivation
proceeds by solving Subgoals (1), (2), (5), and (6), causing Isabelle to instantiate the
remaining metavariables. When the derivation is complete, the synthesized program will
be represented by the fully instantiated Subgoals (3) and (4).
In the next step, resolution with the definition of reverse trivially solves the first
two subgoals, and instantiates the schema variables ?T1, ?K1, and ?R1, giving a fully
instantiated definition for the new function qrev (now Subgoals (1) and (2)).
†We again use pretty-printed Isabelle syntax, omitting type annotations and using # to denote cons.
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Proof of State 4.3
∀x y. reverse(x, y) = qrev(x, ?N1, y)
(1) ∀y z. qrev([], y, z) = (∃x1. x1 = [] & append(x1, y, z))
(2) ∀h t y z. qrev((h#t), y, z)
= (∃x1 x2. x1 = [h] & append(x1, y, x2) & qrev(t, x2, z))
(3) ∀x y. append(x, ?N1, y) = (x = y)
(4) ∀x y z r. (∃y1. append(x, y, y1) & append(y1, z, r))
= (∃z1. append(y, z, z1) & append(x, z1, r))
It remains to prove Subgoals (3) and (4), which we do by resolution with two lemmas
stating simple properties of append. This step instantiates ?N to []. No schema variables
remain, and we have a complete implementation of reverse in terms of qrev, represented
by the remaining subgoals. Discharging these, we obtain the metatheorem:
[[∀y. reverse([], y) = (y = []);
∀h t y. reverse(h#t, y) = (∃x1 x2. x1 = [h] & reverse(t, x2) & append(x2, x1, y));
∀y z. qrev([], y, z) = (∃x1. x1 = [] & append(x1, y, z));
∀h t y z. qrev(h#t, y, z) = (∃x1. x1 = [h] & (∃x2. append(x1, y, x2) & qrev(t, x2, z)))
]] =⇒ ∀x y. reverse(x, y) = qrev(x, [], y)
The definition of qrev represents a reverse algorithm that can be translated directly
to the following Prolog program:
qrev([],Y,Z) :- (X1 = []), append(X1,Y,Z).
qrev([H|T],Y,Z) :- (X1 = [H]), append(X1,Y,X2), qrev(T,X2,Z).
rev(X,Y) :- qrev(X,[],Y).
This program is more efficient than the original. Each call to append executes in constant
time since the first argument is bound to either an empty list or a singleton list; hence,
the entire program executes in linear time, and in both directions (e.g. reversing input
X into output Y or vice versa). Although in practice one would obtain further “constant
factor” improvements by additional theorem proving (amounting to partial evaluation),
we defer discussion of this kind of development to the next section.
This simple example demonstrates the benefits of representing development schemata
as derived rules in a logical framework with higher-order unification. We have synthesized
a program while proving its correctness and the proof is extremely simple. Nearly all the
difficult theorem proving is encapsulated in the derivation of the development schema,
which can be reused for similar problems. In this sense, as well as summarizing “pro-
gramming knowledge”, schemata also compile many of the difficult development steps.
This compilation of knowledge and development itself is one of the topics of our next
section.
5. The Role of Schemata in Development
The list reverse example provides a proof of concept. However, the development is very
easy and the programs involved are deterministic—essentially translations of functional
programs. In this section, we discuss a more substantial and representative example of
the role of schemata in development: a verified development of an efficient solution to the
n-queens problem. Our goal is to give the reader some insight into the power of derived
schematic rules, and show how they can be combined with different development meth-
ods, including lower-level verification steps and the interactive realization of higher-level
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queens(n, qs)↔ (∃ns. range(0, n− 1,ns) ∧ perm(ns, qs) ∧ safe(qs))
n 6< m → range(n,m, l)↔ (l = [n])
n < m → range(n,m, l)↔ (∃ns. range(n+ 1,m,ns) ∧ l = [n|ns])
perm(xs, [])↔ (xs = [])
perm(xs, [h|t])↔ (∃ys. select(xs, h, ys) ∧ perm(ys, t))
safe([])
safe([h|t])↔ (safe(t) ∧ not attack(t, h))
not attack(xs, x)↔ not attack 3(xs, x, 1)
not attack 3([], x, n)
not attack 3([h|t], x, n)↔ (x 6= h+ n ∧ x 6= h− n ∧ not attack 3(t, x, n+ 1))
xs = [y|ys] → select(xs, y, ys)
xs 6= [y|ys] → select(xs, y, ys)↔ (∃h t zs. xs = [h|t] ∧ select(t, y, zs) ∧ ys = [h|zs])
Figure 7. Specification of the n-queens problem.
development strategies. We also discuss the need for these other methods to compensate
for the limitations of schemata.
In order to avoid excessive detail, the examples in this section are presented (translated
from an Isabelle session) using the informal logical and programming language notation
introduced for development schemata in previous sections.
5.1. the n-queens example
Our example is a verified version of the n-queens program development described by
Sterling and Shapiro (1994). This development begins with a generate-and-test program,
which constitutes an executable specification, and derives an improved version that inter-
leaves the generation and testing of solutions. Sterling and Shapiro assert the equivalence
of the two programs without proof; they describe the development process as “pushing
the tester . . . into the generator”. This is a good description, but glosses over details
that cost significant effort in a formalized development. Here we sketch some of them.
Informally, a solution to the n-queens problem is a placement of n queens on an
n-by-n chessboard so that no queen attacks any other. The development of a formal
specification from this informal statement is an interesting topic, but beyond the scope
of this paper. (See Wirth (1971) and Smith (1990) for further discussions of this problem
in the imperative and functional settings.) Here we merely give a brief description of the
specification (Figure 7), which represents an executable though inefficient logic program.
The specification says that queens(n, qs) holds whenever qs is a permutation of the
natural numbers from 0 to n − 1 representing a solution to the n-queens problem. The
predicate range(0, n− 1,ns) computes the list ns = [0, . . . , n− 1]; perm computes some
permutation of its input list, and safe checks that no queen attacks any other. Viewed as
a logic program, the specification makes an essential use of non-determinism: it generates
a candidate placement of n queens, tests to see if it is a solution, and backtracks if not;
all solutions can be obtained by backtracking.
We represent a placement of k queens on the first k rows of an n-by-n chessboard
(k ≤ n) by a list of k numbers between 0 and n − 1. The ith element of the list is the
column number where we have placed a queen in row i. This representation leads to
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the definitions of the predicates safe, not attack, and not attack 3. A list represents
a safe placement if its tail is safe, and its head does not attack any member of its tail.
The representation chosen guarantees that no row contains more than one queen, and
working only with permutations of [0, . . . , n−1] guarantees that no column contains more
than one queen. Thus not attack need only check for attacks on diagonals. It does this
by using an auxiliary parameter n, representing the distance between rows; a queen in
column x attacks one in column h on the diagonal when x = h± n.
We derive a new definition of queens in terms of a new predicate safe perm.
queens(n, qs)↔ (∃ns. range(0, n− 1,ns) ∧ safe perm(ns, [], qs))
safe perm([],ms, qs)↔ (qs = ms)
ns 6= [] → safe perm(ns,ms, qs)↔ (∃d1 d2. select(ns, d2, d1) ∧
not attack(ms, d2) ∧ safe perm(d1, [d2|ms], qs))
This represents the logic program
queens(N, Qs) :- range(1, N, Ns), safe_perm(Ns, [], Qs)).
safe_perm([], Qs, Qs).




This is precisely Sterling and Shapiro’s solution, except that it does not use negation.
Our synthesis is organized around three schema application steps, part of which we will
see in the next section. The first uses a “loop jamming” schema to merge the definitions
of safe and perm into a new predicate perm safe. The second does the real work: it
exploits the syntactic context established by loop jamming to synthesize a new predicate
safe perm that tests partial solutions and discards them as soon as a conflict is found.
Finally we obtain a linear speedup by eliminating list reversals and by using list cons
instead of append to build up the candidate solutions. The schema applications are
supplemented by verification steps, used to develop the theory of the specification as well
as to “glue together” the schematic proofs.
5.2. schemata as compilations of general programming knowledge
Derived rules compile proof knowledge in a precise sense: there is a schematic derivation
that justifies the rule. The schema variables express generality, and in the case of program
development schemata, they express generality of programming expertise. The question
arises of what kind of development knowledge can be formalized by schemata. We illus-
trate some partial answers through two of the steps of the n-queens development: one
applying a purely syntactic schema, the other applying a schema with semantic applica-
bility conditions. Both are instances of well-known programming concepts: loop jamming
in one case and incremental computation in the other.
A purely syntactic schema generalizes knowledge expressible through syntactic prop-
erties of programs, enforcing these properties through higher-order unification. Since
function-typed schematic variables unify with functions from syntax to syntax, schemata
can express generalizations about function composition, scope restrictions, and (using
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Recursive definitions to be jammed
P ([], x)↔ P1(x)
P ([h|t], x)↔ ∃i. P2(x, h, i) ∧ P (t, i)
Q([])
Q([h|t])↔ Q(t) ∧Q1(h, t)
New definition
R([], x)↔ P1(x)
R([h|t], x)↔ ∃i. P2(x, h, i) ∧R(t, i) ∧Q1(h, t)
Conclusion:
P (x, y) ∧Q(x)↔ R(x, y)
Figure 8. A loop jamming schema.
Input definitions:
perm(xs, [])↔ (xs = [])
perm(xs, [h|t])↔ (∃ys. select(xs, h, ys) ∧ perm(ys, t))
safe([])
safe([h|t])↔ (safe(t) ∧ not attack(t, h))
Output definition:
perm safe(xs, [])↔ (xs = [])
perm safe(xs, [h|t])↔ (∃ys. select(xs, h, ys) ∧ perm safe(ys, t) ∧ not attack(t, h))
Figure 9. Loop jamming in the n-queens development.
segment variables) the structure of sequences of associative operators (see Huet and
Lang, 1978, for a discussion). Sometimes these syntactic restrictions are strong enough
that the development schema can be proved without any applicability premises. “Loop
jamming” for a recursive data type such as lists is an example (see Figure 8).
The application of a syntactic schema is particularly simple: the developer merely
resolves the schema with a suitable goal and solves the resulting proof obligations by
resolution with the appropriate program definitions. In the n-queens problem, the schema
allows us to merge the predicates safe and perm (Figure 9).
In contrast to syntactic schemata are the more powerful schemata that include sche-
matic applicability premises. These premises enforce program properties expressible in
the development theory, supporting general reasoning about unknown functions and re-
lations based on their semantic as well as syntactic properties.
The potential for greater generality of such schemata is illustrated by the first two
tail recursion schemata (Figures 4 and 5) developed in Section 3. The more general rule
applies to programs over any data type for which an appropriate well-founded set can
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Input definition:
xs = [] → (perm safe(xs, ys) ↔ ys = [])
xs 6= [] → (perm safe(xs, ys) ↔ (∃i q q1 q2. select(xs, q, i) ∧ perm safe(i, q2)
∧ q1 = [q] ∧ l not attack(q1, q2) ∧ append(q1, q2, ys)))
Output definition:
xs = [] → (safe perm(xs, a, ys) ↔ ys = a)
xs 6= [] → (safe perm(xs, a, ys) ↔ (∃i q q1 q2. select(xs, q, i) ∧ q1 = [q] ∧ l not attack(q1, a)
∧ append(q1, a, q2) ∧ safe perm(i, q2, ys)))
Figure 10. Application of a tail recursion schema in the n-queens development.
be found, thanks to the applicability premise ((3.11) in Figure 3). The cost is the extra
proof obligation imposed on the user. In the specialized version, the presence of list
constructors, i.e. the syntactic form of the arguments, is enough to justify the derivation
step, leading to a rule narrower in scope but simpler to apply.
Generality can lead to surprising opportunities for reuse. A small modification (dis-
cussed in Section 5.3) of the schema for logic programs over well-founded relations of
Figure 3 in Section 3.1 plays a major role in the n-queens development. This is surpris-
ing because the initial program makes use of backtracking, and as a result the schema
might seem to offer no improvement: the program stack cannot be eliminated because of
the need to record backtracking points. However, the transformation is used in this case
not to eliminate the stack, but to incrementally build candidate solutions. This allows
the search to discard partial candidates as soon as an attacking queen is generated. Of
course, the relation between tail recursion transformations and other transformations
that increase incrementally is well known (Bird, 1984), but this development schema
formalizes a wide range of incrementally improvements in one rule.
The result of the application of the schema to the n-queens problem is shown in
Figure 10; the input definition is obtained from the output definition of Figure 9 by
methods to be discussed later. The new predicate l not attack is a generalization to lists
of not attack, introduced so that the program types are compatible with the schema.
In the output definition of Figure 10, the accumulator a is tested for conflicts with the
candidate placement q, and the recursive call is not executed if a conflict is found.
The two schema applications illustrated here demonstrate how some kinds of program-
ming knowledge can be “compiled” into derived rules of inference. At the same time, they
illustrate some of the limitations of schemata.
5.3. limitations of schemata
Schemata can capture some generalizations about programming, but their power is lim-
ited by the over-specificity of both program syntax and logical syntax. Here we consider
some types of programming knowledge that are either poorly captured by our schemata
or not expressible at all.
To begin with, schemata force a commitment to a syntactic representation that is often
too specialized. For example, the “loop jamming” schema of Figure 8 is not fully general,
even for programs defined by recursion over lists. The arity of predicates as well as the
order of conjuncts in the bodies of the definitions have been tailored to the problem
at hand. In the design of schemata it is often necessary to trade generality for ease
of application and readability. For example, packaging all parameters of each predicate
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or function into a tuple can sometimes enable one schema to apply to programs with
different arities, at the expense of tedious detail in the proofs as well as obscuring the
syntax of the programs. A better solution is probably to automatically generate and
prove members of a “schema family” from user specifications of arities.
Another example is the use of the “tail recursion” schema to introduce incremental
computation into the n-queens program. There, the schema of Figure 3 had to be modi-
fied, because of different numbers of existential variables that represent sharing between
the conjuncts of a definition. A fully general version of this schema would be harder to
verify and apply. For the n-queens problem, the original schema was altered to allow the
input to be split by the descent relation non-deterministically into two parts, represented
by two existential variables. A more general version might allow splitting into an arbi-
trary number of parts, represented by a tuple-typed existential variable. Such a strategy
has a cost in readability and ease of application.
Some generalizations about programming are not pattern matching even in the in-
formal sense and hence cannot be captured by schemata. Design patterns (Gamma et
al., 1995), which broadly classify software architectures and solutions to software design
problems, are an attempt at deeper generalization than can be expressed by schemata.
Alternatively, development often involves insights, for instance which development steps
to try and in what order, that are clearly beyond the scope of our schemata.
5.4. mixed strategies in a logical framework
The programmability, flexibility, and transparency of a logical framework such as Is-
abelle offer possibilities for easily integrating the use of development schemata with other
development methods, both more and less general than schemata.
At a lower level of abstraction, verification steps may be an appropriate part of de-
velopments based primarily on synthesis. In our n-queens synthesis, we verified concrete
programs for two main reasons. First, we needed to prove properties of the specification.
One such property is safe(qs) ↔ safe(reverse(qs)), used to remove the use of the list
reverse function introduced with the partial solution accumulator. Second, the result of
one development schema may fail to match the premises of the next one to be used,
because of trivial syntactic differences; this is illustrated by the mismatch between the
output program of Figure 9 and the input program of Figure 10. The necessary sim-
plification, partial evaluation, or even somewhat deeper transformations are often easier
to state concretely and verify than to capture as abstract schemata. Mixing verification
with schema application makes few demands on the user in a framework such as Isabelle:
since schema application is like the application of any other logical rule, schema-based
development and verification proof require the same set of skills, allowing the user to
select an appropriate method freely.
At a higher level of abstraction, tactics and general metaprograms can be used to
generate families of schemata, or implement algorithmic development knowledge and
heuristically guided search procedures, without compromising correctness. In principle,
tactics could also be used to implement the knowledge formalized by a development
schema. However, schemata are better than tactics at explaining the knowledge they
capture because they are transparent: they are declarative, and they are applied by
the same mechanism used for any other inference rule. A schema is easier to understand
than a tactic in the same way that a specification is easier to understand than a program.
Schemata are also more robust than tactics since they are less sensitive to changes in
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the operation of the proof assistant. Thus a fruitful line of development is to formalize
as much as possible schematically and supplement schemata with rewriting, decision
procedures, heuristic search, and other tactics.
6. Related Work
We consider here related approaches to program development in general as well as
work in logic programming related to our examples.
6.1. formal program development
The formal program development methodologies most closely related to our work are
resolution-based approaches, deductive synthesis, and constructive synthesis.
resolution-based development
In our work, different kinds of program development (verification, transformation, and
synthesis) are all based on the same mechanism: formal proof where rules are applied
using higher-order resolution. The idea of using resolution as a basis for development
has a long history in theorem proving in first-order theories using first-order resolution.
An early application, due to Green (1969), was to show how resolution could be used to
construct terms that represent plans or, more generally, functions.
In particular, to see if ∀x. ∃y. R(x, y) follows from a set of formulae, Green negates
it and turns it into the clause {¬R(a, y)}, where a is a new constant. He then uses
resolution to derive an inconsistency in some appropriate theory, yielding a unifier for
y. For example, in a theory of arithmetic we might obtain the unifier a+ 2 for y. Hence
resolution can be used to solve for y as a “function” of a, and only first-order variables
and unification have been used in the proof process. First-order variables and unification
suffice because skolemizing removes quantifiers, which are the only binding operators in
first-order logic, and at the same time (implicitly) extends the signature (e.g. with a) in
which the theorem is proved. Resolution does not really synthesize a function, but rather
a first-order term; however, since a is arbitrary, it can be generalized afterwards, i.e. y is
the function λa. a+ 2.
The above kind of development is first-order in two respects: first-order theories for-
malize data types and programs and first-order resolution builds programs during proofs.
This is in contrast to our work, which is higher order both with respect to the logics in-
volved and with respect to resolution. As explained in Section 2.4, we use a higher-order
metalogic to formalize rules. This supports a more direct representation of rules than
a clausal form would, and higher-order variables play an essential role in formalizing
program schemata, i.e. specifying the form and function of program instances.
Another important distinction is the way we introduce possibly recursive program
definitions: a program schema defines a class of functions where the defined function
may be used in the definition. In our developments, schema application leads to concrete
recursive functions, which arise as subgoals during proofs. For example, in Section 4, we
apply our tail recursion schema to a goal stating the equality of reverse and a program
schema; the definition of qrev manifests itself in the proof in the form of subgoals (the
third and fourth), which are discharged at the end of the derivation by making them
assumptions. Hence, program development (like schema development) constitutes the
Schemata as Derived Rules 31
derivation of a rule in the metalogic: the equivalence of the specification and the program
follows from premises that constitute the new program definition. This approach exploits
the duality between proof states and rules (see Section 2.3) and is not possible in the
setting of a conventional first (or higher-order) resolution prover.
deductive synthesis
There are a number of approaches loosely classified under the heading of deductive
synthesis that also have close ties to resolution-based development, even if they are
formalized otherwise. A standard example of deductive synthesis is the Deductive Tableau
Methodology developed by Manna and Waldinger (1992). Under this methodology, one
proves a ∀/∃ goal such as ∀x. ∃y. R(x, y) by manipulating R(x, y) in a tableau where x
is turned into an eigenvariable and y is placed in a special “output column”. Essentially,
y plays the role of a metavariable that is incrementally instantiated during subsequent
proof steps. At the end of the proof, if variables have been instantiated to ground terms
meeting certain side conditions, then the tableau yields a completed program.
As with the work of Green, it is possible to recast deductive tableau proofs as schematic
proofs constructed using resolution. The essence is showing that one can derive rules in an
appropriate theory that can simulate deductive tableau proof steps and whose application
by higher-order resolution builds programs (see Ayari and Basin, 1996, for details). The
idea of implementing or reinterpreting different approaches to deductive synthesis using
schematic- or resolution-based proofs has also been investigated by others (Heisel et al.,
1990; Coen, 1992; Kraan et al., 1993).
The idea of formalizing transformation rules within higher-order logic has been exam-
ined by other researchers in different contexts. For example, Shankar (1996) formalizes
program transformations for functional programs as theorems in higher-order logic in
the PVS theorem power. These can be manually applied (by providing substitutions to
“backchain” through lemmata) to carry out transformations. Another example is the
work of Kolyang et al. (1996), who formalize a “global search” transformation schema in
Isabelle/HOL, using the ideas presented here; they also show how such transformation
can be supported with a graphical interface.
constructive synthesis
A distinction is sometimes made in the literature between deductive synthesis methods
and constructive synthesis methods, e.g. Deville and Lau (1993). The latter are typically
based on some kind of constructive logic, or type theory, equipped with a notion of
realizability, and one develops programs by proving that a term t (the program) belongs
to a type T (the specification), i.e. t ∈ T .
Metavariables can be employed in type theories in ways similar to what we have de-
scribed here. For example, Paulson (1994b) documents an implementation in Isabelle of
a constructive type theory (one of Martin-Lo¨f’s). Rules are applied with higher-order res-
olution and, in proving t ∈ T , t may be a ground term of the type theory, a metavariable,
or even a combination of the two. In the first case we have verification, in the second,
synthesis, and in the third, a hybrid, where some parts of the program structure are
known and others are left unspecified (see Hesketh et al., 1992, for uses of such hybrid
verification/synthesis). Note too that T may be a metavariable, in which case theorem
proving corresponds to type reconstruction. Similarly, Anderson (1994) uses higher-order
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unification for program derivation in constructive logic, representing transformations of
proof objects (rather than programs) by derived schematic rules in the metalogic LF.
Thus, the idea of development based on schematic proof suffices to explain program
synthesis, at least in some constructive logics. A common explanation of program syn-
thesis is that it is possible because the logic is constructive: a proof yields a program
that exhibits the implicit construction. This is correct but the emphasis can mislead.
Unification during schematic developments is enough to account for synthesis. Construc-
tivity does not play a role in the synthesis of programs, but rather in their execution and
meaning. That is, because the logic is constructive, the terms extracted can be executed
and their evaluation behavior agrees with the semantics of the type theory.
6.2. logic program development
Given the close relationship between logic programs and first-order theories, it is not
surprising that formal program development has been an active research topic in the logic
programming community (Deville and Lau, 1993; Pettorossi and Proietti, 1999). There
has also been a considerable cross-fertilization of ideas from research on development in
general: many approaches for synthesizing or transforming functional and imperative pro-
grams have their logic program counterparts, e.g. unfold-fold style derivations (Tamaki
and Sato, 1984) or other approaches to deductive synthesis based on substituting formu-
lae with equivalent formulae (Clark and Ta¨rnlund, 1977; Hogger, 1981).
The fact that logic programs are both formulae and programs may give the impression
that logic program development is simply reasoning about the equivalence of formulae.
Unfortunately, neither the notion of which formulae constitute programs nor what equiv-
alence means is straightforward. For instance, Horn clauses constitute an obvious class of
programs, but are typically inadequate for reasoning about program properties as they
formalize only “positive” information. For this reason, many researchers prefer to adopt
a closed-world assumption and reason about the so-called (Clark) completion of a logic
program. Furthermore, given some representation of programs as formulae (e.g. Horn
clauses or their completions) there are many rival notions of equivalence. For instance,
Maher shows that there is a surprisingly large number of distinct “reasonable” notions
of equivalence, which are based on the logical, operational, or functional reading of pro-
grams (Maher, 1987). The considerable body of literature in logic program development is
partially a manifestation of this complexity as different authors consider different classes
of programs and notions of equivalence.
In our work, we have formalized logic programs in two different ways. First, as first-
order formulae in a restricted language (see Sections 3.1 and 3.2), where each program is
associated with a set of formulae that define it for different possible inputs. This formalism
is that used by Bundy, Smaill and Wiggins 1990 and is similar to the logic descriptions
of Flener and Deville (1991). Second, as Horn clauses (see Section 3.3), which constitute
an inductive definition. We have also explored different notions of equivalence. With
respect to the first formalization we have viewed equivalence as provable equivalence
in either a theory of well-founded relations or a theory that axiomatizes recursive data
types with their own induction principles. With respect to the formalization based on
inductive definitions, equivalence means provable equivalence in higher-order logic in a
theory where the program schemata are formalized as inductively defined relations. This
approach, of viewing pure logic programs as defining not a first-order theory, but rather
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a set of inductive definitions, has been also taken by Paulson and Smith (1991), Aronsson
et al. (1991) and Hagiya and Sakurai (1984).
Of course, there are many other approaches possible; ours simply serve as examples
chosen to illustrate the ideas of this paper. In the end, which approach one takes de-
pends on what properties should hold for the synthesized or transformed program. In
our examples, the second approach yields more general schemata than the first, but it
requires a more specialized semantics for logic programs. That is, pure logic programs
(or their completions) no longer constitute a first-order theory, with a corresponding
notion of semantic entailment, but rather an inductive definition, which corresponds to
the “TP ”-semantics of van Emden and Kowalski (1976).
7. Conclusion and Future Work
Our focus has been on the unification of distinct concepts in a common framework
and the practical gains that result from this. The use of a formal metalogic and proof
by higher-order resolution are the two key ingredients. The formal metalogic supports
the uniform formalization of development schemata and developments, and higher-order
resolution allows us to construct different kinds of developments in a similar way, includ-
ing synthesis, transformation, verification, and the derivation of development schemata
themselves. The practical gains are based on the ability to use what has now become
standard theorem proving technology in exploring and carrying out schema-based devel-
opments and combining this with other development styles.
One advantage of a common framework is that it aids comparison. We have made vari-
ous comparisons throughout this paper, e.g. development methodologies (Section 6.1) and
development styles (Section 5). Moreover, our framework provides, in a very general way,
a formal basis for “comparative schematology”: we can compare schemata themselves
based on various formalizable relationships between them and their supporting theories.
For example, within a fixed theory we can compare development schemata under differ-
ent notions of subsumption. From the schema for general well-founded data types given
in Section 3.1, we derived a tail recursion schema for lists in Section 3.2. The second
schema is more specific than the first in two ways: its types are more specialized, and the
well-founded order is fixed. These are independent specializations; the first constitutes a
type instantiation and the second an instantiation of a term (relation) schema variable.
There are other possible notions of subsumption too, e.g. one schema may logically entail
another. The use of a logical framework allows us to study these relationships and their
tradeoffs in practice. For example, specialized schemata often entail less deduction after
application because the deduction saved is, essentially, compiled into the derivation of
the schema.
Our framework also eases the comparison and development of schemata for different
theories and even languages. At the heart of such a comparison is a quest for generality:
much of program development is centered around algorithmic and data type refinement
and these are often, when viewed from a high enough level of abstraction, language
independent. The schemata we used for logic program development are variants of the
functional program development schema given in Figure 1, which is derivable in a rather
different formal system (e.g. using fixedpoint induction in some formalization of domain
theory, such as Scott’s Logic for Computable Functions, LCF). Similar ideas are presented
by Basin and Friedrich (1996), where schemata for logic program development are used
to develop circuit descriptions.
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Finding useful development schemata is a difficult and creative process and our ex-
ample suggests the possibility of “technology transfer” where, for example, development
schemata for functional program transformation can be suitably reformulated for logic
programs. Our exploration of different notions of equivalence can, in this light, be seen
as an exploration of which semantics and corresponding deductive systems are suffi-
cient to derive rules that are developed for, and derived in, rather different settings.
By viewing development schemata as derived rules, we have the possibility of showing
that certain translation techniques work uniformly over classes of schemata. Such an
investigation could be based on proof theory (e.g. establishing sufficient conditions for
relational schemata to be provable by relational induction when the corresponding func-
tional schemata are provable by fixedpoint induction) or semantically (e.g. based on a
common semantics for the rules). Investigating these possibilities, and, more generally,
metatheory appropriate for establishing transfer results for development schemata, is an
interesting area for future work.
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